A New Category of Contractual Breach in Auto Insurance: Statutory  Default by Rendall, James A.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 16, Number 3 (November 1978) Article 4
A New Category of Contractual Breach in Auto
Insurance: Statutory "Default"
James A. Rendall
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Rendall, James A.. "A New Category of Contractual Breach in Auto Insurance: Statutory "Default"." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 16.3
(1978) : 625-638.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol16/iss3/4
A NEW CATEGORY OF CONTRACTUAL
BREACH IN AUTO INSURANCE:
STATUTORY DEFAULT"
By JAMES A. RENDALL*
In a recent judgment, Halifax Insurance Co. v. Judgment Recovery
(N.S.) Ltd.,1 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has demonstrated again the
vigour of the common law, sustained by unlimited judicial ingenuity. The best
summary of the case is this first sentence from the judgment delivered by
MacKeigan C.J.N.S.: "This appeal is on a simple question of law: Does the
appellant, insurer under a motor vehicle liability policy, have to respond to
the claim of a third party injured by the insured, where the insured had
replaced the automobile specified in the policy without notifying the insurer
within 14 days of having done so?"
If the question is simple, the answer is not. It involves the complex and
refined distinction between restrictive definitions of risk in insurance contracts
and breach of a policy condition, and it involves analysis of the elaborate
statutory scheme to protect automobile accident victims by imposing a form
of strict liability on the tortfeasor's insurer.
At trial the question posed above was answered adversely to the insurer
by Cowan C.J.T.D. In an earlier note,3 I criticized Cowan C.J.'s judgment
for failing to observe the difficult but fundamental distinction between risk
definition and breach of condition, and for relying upon General Security Ins.
Co. of Canada v. Highway Victims Indemnity Fund4 which, though an ex-
cellent Supreme Court of Canada judgment on a similar set of facts, was an
inapt authority because of the different wording of the Quebec and the Nova
Scotia statutes.
The Halifax Insurance Company's appeal has now been dismissed. The
judgment is much harder to criticize, except by observing that it creates a
new category of contractual breach, which apparently falls nicely in the
middle between the two old categories which were so nearly indistinguishable
that one can only marvel that there is any room between them to fit anything.
o Copyright, 1978, James A. Rendall.
* Mr. Rendall is a Professor of Law at the University of Calgary.
(1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 107.
2 Re Judgment Recovery (N.S.) Ltd. and Halifax Ins. Co.; Lane v. Young (1977),
73 D.L.R. (3d) 445.
3 J. Rendall, The Distinction Between Breach of Condition and Restrictive Defini-
tion of Risk in Automobile Insurance Policies: Lane v. Young (1978), 2 Can. Bus. LJ.
320.
4 [1976] I.L.R. 2703.
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The Facts of the Case:
The Halifax Insurance Company issued an owner's policy of automobile
insurance to Avery Young; the described automobile was a 1969 Pontiac.
Young sold the Pontiac and bought a 1969 Ford, but did not inform the
insurer. Twenty days later Young collided with, and injured, Rickey Lane.
It is true that the question can be formed very simply: was Halifax
Insurance Company obliged to respond to Rickey Lane's claim? If it was not,
then the public fund, Judgment Recovery (N.S.) Ltd., was obliged to answer
the claim.
The Basic Insurance Doctrine:
In contrast to the simple fact pattern, the doctrinal context is complex,
for the case involves the tension between the insurer's right to control its risk
selection and the public interest in guaranteeing an insurance recovery for
automobile injury victims.
Prior to this case, questions of risk selection and control fell to be con-
sidered under four heads,
(i) duty of disclosure;
(ii) material change in the risk;
(iii) breach of condition;
(iv) definition of risk.
A review of these four categories which, it was thought, subsumed all
cases of the nature presently under discussion, requires reference to two
sections of the Insurance Act, to one of the statutory conditions, and to a
definition provision in the standard owner's policy of automobile insurance.
(i) Duty of Disclosure: Section 79 of the Nova Scotia Insurance Actu
avoids the policy, as against the insured, if the insured has given "false par-
ticulars of the described automobile ... to the prejudice of the insurer" or
has "knowingly misrepresented or failed to disclose in the application any
fact required to be stated therein."
At trial, Cowan C.J. noted that the Pontiac and the Ford were both
standard types of vehicle, so the premium for public liability cover would
be the same. Thus, if Young had obtained his policy from Halifax Insurance
Company by describing his car as a 1969 Pontiac, when it was in fact a 1969
Ford, it is not clear that this inaccuracy would avoid the policy. Although
the description might be "false," it could hardly be said to be "to the preju-
dice of the insurer." Whether the insurer would have a defence based on a
"knowing misrepresentation" depends upon the meaning of "required to be
stated." If that phrase implies a materiality test, then again the description
of the car as a Pontiac instead of a Ford would give the insurer no defence.
In any event, such a misdescription of the car would give the insurer
no defence to a claim by the third party injury victim. Subsection 98(1)
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confers on the third party judgment creditor a direct right of action against
the insurer," and subsection 98(5) says that it is no defence that "an instru-
ment issued as a motor vehicle liability policy . . . is not a motor vehicle
liability policy."'7 This obliquely worded provision has consistently been
interpreted to prevent an insurer from defending against the third party claim
on the basis of a misrepresentation leading to the issue of the policy.
(ii) Material Change in the Risk: Statutory Condition #1 of the
standard schedule of statutory conditions relating to automobile insurance"
obliges the insured to "promptly notify" the insurer "of any change in the risk
material to the contract and within his knowledge." Avery Young notified his
insurer that he had traded cars twenty-one days after the trade and one day
after the accident. On first impression, whether or not this notification was
"prompt" enough, it would seem that he was not obliged to give it in any
event since the change in vehicles was not material to the risk.
However, this overlooks Statutory Condition #1 (2), which makes every
sale of the insured vehicle a material change that must be reported to the
insurer. This point will be developed at considerable length toward the end
of this note.
Even if Young offended Statutory Condition # 1, the insurer would have
no defence as against Lane. As we shall note in a moment, breaches of condi-
tion afford the insurer no defence to the third party's claim.
(iii) Breach of Condition: The insured's conduct may amount to a
breach of a condition imported into the insurance contract by statutory pre-
scription (i.e., a "statutory condition") or a condition agreed to by the
parties (i.e., a "purely contractual condition"). In either case, the breach
would give the insurer a defence to any claim brought under the policy by
the insured, but would afford no defence against a third party judgment credi-
tor of the insured. Paragraph 98(4) (b) of the Insurance Act9 provides that
"the right of a person who is entitled under subsection (1) to have insurance
money applied upon his judgment or claim is not prejudiced by ... any act
or default of the insured before or after [the event giving rise to the claim]
in contravention of this part [of the Act] or of the terms of the contract.'
(iv) Definition of Risk: Although their purpose is the same, to restrict
the risk being assumed and to refine the statement of the risk assumed,
insurance law has treated very differently two devices: the policy condition
and the restrictive definition.
A breach of condition is incurable. If the insured breaches a condition,
5 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148, as amended by S.N.S. 1966 c. 79, proclaimed Jan. 1, 1969.
The equivalent provision in Ontario is s. 204 of The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 224.
6Id. The Ontario equivalent is s. 225(1).
7 Id. The Ontario equivalent is s. 225(5).
8 See: the Schedule to Part VI of the Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148. See
also: s. 205 of the Ontario Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
9 The Ontario equivalent is s. 225(4), R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
1978]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
his policy may be avoided when the insurer learns of the breach, and the only
cure is waiver by the insurer. By contrast, an insured may be able, unilateral-
ly, to cure a failure to comply with a definition of the risk. For example, in
Re Morgan and Provincial Ins. Co.,'0 a truck was insured pursuant to a pro-
posal form which stated that the truck would be used to transport coal, and a
recital in the policy purported to incorporate all the answers in the proposal
as the basis of the contract. The truck was used temporarily to transport
timber, no harm occurring during this time. Later the truck was damaged in
a collision while carrying coal. Had its use to carry timber been a breach of
condition, the policy would have been thereby avoided even though the
breach was temporary and unrelated to the loss. However, it was held that
the statement as to use of the truck was definitional of the risk; in the result,
the insured was off cover whenever the truck was used for a purpose other
than transportation of coal, but was covered whenever the truck was trans-
porting coal.
Although a failure to comply with the risk as defined in the policy is less
serious in that it may be cured by the insured, such a failure is more danger-
ous to the insured in another way. In response to the insurance industry's
zealous use of policy conditions, legislatures have long since developed de-
vices to control their application. In the Automobile Part of the Insurance
Act, a schedule imports into every policy a set of nine statutory conditions"1
and section 8012 prohibits the insurer from varying, omitting or adding to the
statutory conditions. Moreover, although a breach of condition will avoid
the policy as against the insured, it does not give the insurer a defence to a
claim by a third party judgment creditor except insofar as that claim exceeds
the statutory minimum limits of liability.
In contrast to this rigorous supervision of policy conditions, the Insurance
Act leaves virtually untouched the insurer's freedom to control its risk by
careful definition thereof. Section 821s prescribes that an owner's policy, as
well as covering all named drivers, must insure against loss caused by anyone
driving the described vehicle with the owner's consent. Apart from this im-
portant prescription, the Act leaves virtually unfettered the parties' freedom
to make their own contract so far as agreement on the risk is concerned.
Thus, the insurer, by carefully stating the risk undertaken in its policy, may
be able to give itself a defence to later claims by the insured or by a third
party in a way which it could not do through the device of a policy condition.
The Standard Owner's Policy:
When the vehicle described in an owner's policy is disposed of, the
policy does not lapse, but continues in force to insure his third party liability
30 [1932] 2 K.B. 70 (C.A.), aff'd [1933] A.C. 240 (H.L.).
"See: Schedule to Part VI of the Nova Scotia Act, R.S.N.C. 1967, c. 148, and
s. 204 of the Ontario Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
12 The equivalent in Ontario is s. 205(1), R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
13The equivalent in Ontario is s. 207, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
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in respect of any loss caused by driving a vehicle he does not own; in effect,
the owner's policy becomes a non-owner's policy.14
When the insured disposes of the described vehicle and replaces it with
another, in theory this situation could be treated as a potential material change
in the risk to be dealt with by Statutory Condition #1. If the risk was in-
creased the policy would be avoided unless the insured "promptly notified"
the insurer. If, as Cowan C.J. said was the case when Avery Young replaced
his 1969 Pontiac with a 1969 Ford, the risk was not affected, then the policy
would continue and would cover the new vehicle.
However, the law does not seem to follow this theory. Apparently con-
ceding the insurer's right to know what vehicle it is covering, and to restrict
its coverage to that vehicle without reference to materiality, the law applies
very stringent restrictions to vehicle changes. First, Statutory Condition #1
requires the insured to notify his insurer of any sale of the described vehicle.
Secondly, as a matter of basic insurance doctrine, the policy description of
the vehicle appears to be treated as a restrictive definition of the risk. Just
as a fire insurance policy issued without rectifiable error to cover the house
at No. 10 Cedar Street would not cover an identical house at No. 11 Cedar
Street, an auto policy describing a 1969 Pontiac as the insured vehicle does
not cover a 1969 Ford, a 1969 Dodge nor even a 1969 Pontiac other than
the one specifically described in the policy by reference to engine and body
numbers.
The insurer's right to restrictively define its risk appears to be endorsed
even by those provisions of the Insurance Act that operate to give statutory
extended coverage and to give top priority to protection of automobile injury
victims. Section 82 causes an owner's policy to insure in respect of losses
caused by someone driving with the owner's consent if he "drives an auto-
mobile owned by the insured . . . and within the description or definition
thereof in the contract."'5 Subsection 98 (1) gives the third party direct action
against the insurer to "[a]ny person who has a claim against an insured, for
which indemnity is provided by a contract.""'
However, motor vehicle owners will, in the ordinary course of things,
frequently trade vehicles in the middle of an insurance policy year. To solve
the numerous serious problems that would result, the insurance industry took
the initiative in adding to the standard owner's policy the following clause
to give extended coverage:
AUTOMOBILE DEFINED-In this Policy except where stated to the contrary
the words "the automobile" mean:
(b) A Newly Acquired Automobile-an automobile, ownership of which is
acquired by the insured and, within fourteen days following the date of its delivery
to him, notified to the Insurer ....
14 Minister of Transport for Ontario v. Economical Mutual Insurance Co. (1973),
40 D.L.R. (3d) 651; 1 O.R. (2d) 459; [1974] I.L.R. 761 (H.C.J.); aff'd 43 D.L.R.
(3d) 27n; [1974] I.L.R. 991 (C.A.), without written reasons.
1 5 Emphasis added.
16 Emphasis added.
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Thus, if Avery Young had notified the Halifax Insurance Company of
his trade of the Pontiac for the Ford within two weeks after the trade, the
Ford would have been an insured vehicle under the policy and there would
have been no dispute as to the insurer's obligation to answer Rickey Lane's
claim.
Young did not give that notice, and MacKeigan C.J.'s deceptively simple
question becomes more complex: into which of the four categories of con-
tractual breach does Young's conduct fall? Clearly, it does not fit within
category (i), failure of disclosure. That concept is reserved for dealings be-
tween the parties at the time of application for the insurance, and does not
touch upon matters arising after the insurance contract is on foot.
Young's conduct could be viewed as falling into category (ii), a change
potentially material to the risk, or into category (iii), a breach of condition.
As will be discussed below, the judicial comments at trial and on appeal rest
largely on those two categories, though neither judge put Young's conduct
into either category and neither relied on either concept as the real basis
for decision.
Before discussing the two judgments, it must be noted that the position
taken by the Halifax Insurance Company was that the incident fell within
category (iv), definition of risk. The policy described a 1969 Pontiac; through
a definitional clause in the policy it would extend also to any replacement
vehicle, acquisition of which was notified to the insurer within fourteen days.
Young did not notify the insurer within that time; in the result, the Ford was
simply outside the risk as defined in Young's policy and, accordingly, the
Halifax Insurance Company was not liable either to Young or to any third
party victim of his.
Judicial Gerrymandering at Trial:
Cowan C.J.T.D. noted that the change in vehicles did not adversely
affect the insurer's risk and called in aid a proposition stated by Pigeon J.,
in a case involving similar, facts,17 that the insurer should not, as against the
injury victims, be entitled to set up a failure to give notice of a vehicle change
which did not prejudice the insurer when it could not set up as a defence
failure to notify it of an accident, a failure which could be extremely preju-
dicial to the insurer.
This proposition has two important attributes in its favour. It seems
logical, and it seems to reflect good public policy. However, we are dealing
with an area of insurance law which, as has been illustrated, is characterized
not by logic but by rather arbitrary distinctions.
Cowan C.I., too good a judge to leave his judgment dependent solely
on logic and public policy, sought some kind of solid doctrinal base. It is
worth noting that he did not treat Young's conduct as falling into category
17 General Security Ins. Co. of Canada v. Highway Victims Indemnity Fund, [1976]
I.L.R. 2703 (S.C.C.).
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(ii). To say that substitution of the Ford for the Pontiac was merely a change
relating to the risk, but in the circumstances immaterial in that it in no way
increased the risk, would involve the conclusion that the change did not have
to be reported and failure to report would give the insurer no defence either
against the insured or against his victim.18 It is quite clear from the trial
judgment and the judgment on appeal that there was no judicial sentiment
in favour of Avery Young. Both Cowan C.J. and MacKeigan C.J. sought
to fix the Halifax Ins. Co. with responsibility for Rickey Lane's loss, while
leaving the insurer free to raise its defences against Avery Young and to
recoup itself from Young if it wished.
Cowan C.J. went about this by considering the insurance position during
the fourteen days immediately following the trade of the Pontiac for the
Ford. For many years the only Canadian authority on this point was Pascoe
v. Provincial Treasurer of Manitoba19 in which the trial judge, Monnin J.,
had stated that a newly-acquired vehicle is automatically covered for the first
14 days, the coverage lapsing if notice is not given to the insurer within that
time. Tritschler J.A., pointing out that there was no duty on the insured to
take action to cause his insurance policy to cover the new vehicle, concluded
that the new car would not be insured, even within the first 14 days, unless
and until the insured gave the requisite notice. The point was not determina-
tive of the result in Pascoe. The accident having occurred 20 days after ac-
quisition of the new vehicle, a majority of the Court of Appeal was content
to say that whatever may have been the case during the first 14 days, there
was no insurance coverage at the time of the accident.
Cowan C.J. preferred Monnin J.'s view of the 14-day clause and con-
cluded that Avery Young's Ford was insured for 14 days and the coverage
then lapsed. By itself, this conclusion gets Rickey Lane and Judgment Re-
covery (N.S.) Ltd. nowhere in their contest with the Halifax Ins. Co. When
a motor vehicle policy lapses for failure to pay a renewal premium, the vehicle
is off cover and the insurer is responsible neither to the insured nor to his vic-
tims. However, Cowan C.J. cited the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in
General Security Ins. Co. of Canada v. Highway Victims Indemnity Fund2" as
authority for the different treatment of a "lapse" which results from failure to
comply with the 14-day clause. It is true that Pigeon J. took the view that
a newly acquired vehicle was covered for 14 days and that failure to notify
the insurer produced a lapse. It is also true that the Court held that a lapse
in those circumstances afforded the insurer no defence to a claim by the third
party injury victim.
It is vitally important to note that the General Security case arose under
the Quebec Act, which expressly prohibits an insurer from setting up against
i As will be pointed out later, this is the conclusion one would draw on first
impression, but closer analysis of the Insurance Act suggests that it is incorrect.
19 (1958), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 300; 26 W.W.R. 640; [1958] I.L.R. 469 (Man. Q.B.);
aff'd 17 D.L.R. (2d) 234; 27 W.W.R. 393; [1959] I.L.R. 552 (Man. C.A.).
20 [1976] .L.R. 2703.
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third parties "the causes of nullity or of lapse that might be set up against
the insured."21
By contrast, the Nova Scotia Act says nothing about a lapse. Subsection
98 (4) says that a third party's claim
. . . is not prejudiced by
(b) any act or default of the insured... in contravention of this Part or of
the terms of the contract.
Indeed, Pigeon J. noted that this was the language of the Manitoba Act
under which Pascoe was decided, and he drew attention to the different
wording of the Quebec Act which he described as wider in scope.
In short, by relying on Pigeon J.'s judgment in General Security, Cowan
C.JT.D. seems to have rested on an inapplicable authority.
Judicial Gerrymandering on Appeal:
The point in Lane v. Young was very important to the entire auto insur-
ance industry. An appeal was taken in the Halifax Ins. Co.'s name, but
sponsored by the Insurance Bureau of Canada. The Court of Appeal sus-
tained Cowan C.J., but on somewhat different grounds.
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. concluded that the 14-day clause could not be a
condition of the insurance contract, else it would be struck down by section
80, which incorporates into the policy the statutory conditions and prohibits
any "variation or omission of or addition to" them.
The Chief Justice also refuted the insurer's contention that the 14-day
notice requirements formed part of the definition of the risk:
I do not look upon the 14 days' notice phrase as part of the description. It is
not needed to identify the subject. The rest of the definition is part of the insuring
agreement. The notice phrase does not change or refine the definition or make
the subject-matter either wider or narrower; it is thus not an exception to or
exclusion from the insuring agreement.22
If the notice clause is neither a condition nor part of the definition of
the risk, what is it? According to MacKeigan C.J. it is "merely a term of the
policy which, if the insured failed to observe it by giving the insurer notice
within 14 days of acquiring the replacement car, would cause a lapse in the
collision coverage on that car which began the moment it replaced the pre-
vious car."23
Thus it will be noted that his Lordship adopted the view taken by
Monnin J. in Pascoe, and approved by Cowan C.J.T.D. in the present case,
that the extended cover under the "Newly Acquired Automobile" clause
attaches automatically to the new vehicle without any necessity for notifica-
2 1 Highway Victims Indemnity Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 232, s. 6. (Emphasis added)
22 (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 197 at 109.
23 Id. at 110.
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tion. The only significance of the notice is that failure to give it causes the
coverage to lapse after 14 days.
However, as has already been remarked, a lapse of coverage normally
involves the result that the insurer is off the risk and responsible neither to
the insured nor to his victims, and unlike the Quebec counterpart, the Nova
Scotia subsection 98 (4) says nothing about preserving the third party's claim
in the face of a lapse.
Nevertheless, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. managed to jam the situation into
paragraph 98 (4) (b) as a "default."
Here the only possible defence by the insurer is that the insured did not comply
with the 14 days' notice term. That was, in my opinion, clearly a "default of the
insured. .. in contravention of the terms of the contract" and thus not available
to the insurer as a defence. 24
Thus, judicial ingenuity has given us a fifth category of contractual
breach to add to the list discussed above. In the title to this note I have, for
brevity's sake, referred to the new category as "statutory default." Actually,
of course, MacKeigan C.J. asserts that the failure to give notice is a "default,"
not in a duty imposed by statute, but in contravention of the contract. Thus,
it would be more apt to style the new category "contractual default as con-
templated by s. 98(4) (b)."
As will now be discussed, this new category involves us in some
difficulties.
Criticism of the MacKeigan Judgment:
The first criticism of this new category is that it is one more indistinct
distinction to add to a list which was already long enough and was giving
rise to problems of characterization.
Perhaps a more forceful criticism is that the language of paragraph
98(4) (b), "act or default.., in contravention ... of the contract," seems
clearly to contemplate a failure by the insured to perform some duty cast
upon him.
In Pascoe, Tritschler J.A. pointed out that the insured is under no duty
to take any action to cause his auto insurance policy to apply to a newly
acquired vehicle:
... he was free to do as he pleased and for any reason which seemed sufficient
to him could elect to take advantage or otherwise of the provision under con-
sideration. Just as any other motorist may decide to insure or not to insure or may
forget to insure, so also might this insured.2 5
There is in Nova Scotia today a rather vague statutory duty to insure
in that the Motor Vehicle Act makes it an offence to drive a vehicle unless
24 Id. at 110.
25 (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 234 at 238; 27 W.W.R. 393 at 397; 66 Man. R. 367
at 375; [1959] I.L.R. 552 at 554 (C.A.).
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either the vehicle or the driver is covered by a liability policy. It is notorious
that even this requirement is finessed by obtaining a pink card and then can-
celling the policy without surrendering the pink card. What is important to
our discussion, however, is that neither the Insurance Act nor the contract
of automobile insurance contains any statement requiring a vehicle owner to
insure.
It is to be noted that MacKeigan C.J. did not assert a "default . . . in
contravention of" the Insurance Act. He held that Avery Young had com-
mitted a default which contravened the terms of the contract. But the "Newly
Acquired Automobile" clause of the contract appears to operate precisely in
the manner suggested by Tritschler J.A., in that it gives the insured an option
to bring his new vehicle within the cover by notifying the insurer, or to leave
it uninsured by refraining from giving the notice. Indeed, the entire matter
seems to involve definition of the risk exactly as the Halifax Ins. Co. argued.
A newly acquired vehicle is within the risk if its acquisition is notified to the
insurer; it is not within the risk if notice is not given.
MacKeigan C.J. is surely wrong in saying that "[t]he notice phrase does
not change or refine the definition or make the subject matter either wider or
narrower;..." 26 It is true that all the inherent attributes of the vehicle are
the same in either case and that the risk is not materially affected by giving
or withholding notice. But the point is that "definition of risk" and "material-
ity to the risk" are separate concepts. In Re Morgan and Provincial Ins. Co. 27
it would have been useless for the insured to prove that transporting timber
did not increase the risk, or even that it was a lower risk activity than carry-
ing coal. The risk was defined in terms of use of the truck to carry coal; when
it was carrying timber it was outside the risk. This analysis is sustained by
Renshaw v. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.28 where a cottage and its
contents were insured "while located and contained as described herein and
not elsewhere." A schedule to the policy fixed the cottage as located on a
specifically numbered lot on Stanley Island in the St. Lawrence River. The
Ontario Court of Appeal held that, by moving the cottage to the mainland,
the insured had taken it outside the risk. It was pointless to argue that the risk
was not materially affected; even if the risk were improved, the cottage was
off cover because it was outside the defined risk. The vast importance to the
insurer of the distinction between "materiality" and "definition of risk" is that
the insurer can, by carefully couching the language in which the risk is de-
fined, exclude activities which might not be regarded as "material" by a
reasonable insurer. Nor is this necessarily reprehensible. As we have noted
above, although replacing a 1969 Pontiac with a 1969 Ford was immaterial
to the risk, none of the judges involved with the dispute between the Halifax
Ins. Co. and Judgment Recovery denied that the insurer was entitled to insist
on being informed of the change. It was the desire to allow the insurer to
raise the failure of the insured to give this information as a defence against
26 Supra note 22, at 109.
2 7 Supra note 10.
28 [1943] O.R. 223; [1943] 2 D.L.R. 76; 10 I.L.R. 92 (C.A.).
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the insured,while at the same time disqualifying it as a defence against the
third party, that led MacKeigan C.J.N.S. to invent the new category of breach
-the paragraph 98 (4) (b) "default."
I think the new category is an unfortunate additional cyst on an already
heavily encrusted insurance doctrine, and I think its basis as propounded by
MacKeigan C.J. is very doubtful, but I cannot disagree with the underlying
philosophy that guided Cowan C.J.T.D. and MacKeigan C.J.N.S.
After a brief survey of the policy considerations prompting the two deci-
sions, I will suggest an alternative analysis by which the same result might
have been reached.
The Fundamental Merits as Between Halifax Insurance Co. and
Judgment Recovery Ltd.:
Both Nova Scotia judgments quoted, and apparently were influenced by,
the following remarks of Pigeon J. in the General Security2 9 case:
[W]hy should the insurer be entitled to set up against the victims the failure to
notify him of a change of car, which causes him no prejudice, when he certainly
cannot set up the failure to give notification of an accident, which could be
extremely prejudicial to him.
[NOTE that in the above paragraph "him" refers to the insurer, and in the
paragraph below Pigeon I. uses the pronoun "he" when referring to the insurer.]
It should be borne in mind that, under the Act of Quebec, the insurers, as
a group, maintain the Fund by assessments on premiums. The purpose of s. 6 is
clearly to prevent an insurer from passing on to the group a risk for which he has
collected a premium. Having to bear the consequences when a false statement
by an insured results in his taking a lower premium than he would otherwise
charge, a fortiori he should not be allowed to pass the liability on to the Fund
because of an omission that caused him no prejudice. In the case at bar, the real
dispute is between the insurer and the Fund. I see no reason for obliging the
latter rather than General Security to indemnify the victims or their legal
representatives.3o
I cannot disagree with this judicial sentiment. The same result as in the
General Security case could be reached in Nova Scotia through an appropri-
ate statutory amendment. Paragraph 98 (4) (b) could be varied to refer to
"lapses" as does section 6 of the Quebec Act. There might be an objection
to this in that such a statutory provision could be taken as applying also to
lapses of coverage for non-payment of a renewal premium.
An alternative would be to introduce prescriptive coverage for unde-
scribed vehicles in the way we presently deal with unnamed drivers. Section
82 makes the insurer liable for loss caused by the described vehicle while it is
being driven by anyone with the named insured's consent. It would be quite
feasible to introduce a similar provision prescribing coverage whenever the
named insured was driving any vehicle, whether or not described in his policy.
This would introduce some statutory control into the matters which are now
dealt with by the extended cover clause of the auto insurance policy under
the heading, "Automobile Defined."
29 Supra note 20.
a0 [1976] I.L.R. 2703 at 2707-08.
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There are some objections to any suggested statutory solution. The nine
common law provinces attempt to maintain uniformity in their respective
insurance statutes, and so the above proposal is really a proposal for change
in nine statutes. In fact, significant differences presently exist as some prov-
inces have adopted a system of no-fault benefits and others have not.
In any event, leaving aside the problems involved in any attempt to
obtain a uniform amendment throughout the common law provinces, it is
frustrating enough to contemplate the likely legislative process in Nova Scotia.
A legislature which has not bothered to correct an obvious error in the sub-
rogation provision of the Auto Insurance Part of the Act, a correction which
could be made by changing one digit, 1 is unlikely to tackle the kind of
significant statutory amendment suggested. Cowan C.J.T.D. and MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. are to be commended for attempting a judicial solution rather than
leaving the problem to be dealt with by a statutory amendment that is un-
likely to be forthcoming.
However, I will suggest a judicial solution which I think preferable to
the ones adopted by Cowan and MacKeigan C.JJ.
Materiality and Statutory Condition #1:
We have noted several times the judicial observation that substituting
a 1969 Ford for a 1969 Pontiac does not materially affect the risk. In the first
instance, therefore, there is some inclination to treat the entire problem of
substituted vehicles as simply a question of change in the risk and materiality.
I suggested that the judges avoided this analysis out of a concern that a find-
ing that the replacement of the named vehicle was not a material change in
the risk would lead to a conclusion that the insurer would have no complaint
and no defence against its own insured for failure to give notice of the trans-
action. Everyone seems to agree that, regardless of its materiality, the insurer
is entitled to insist on knowing what vehicle is covered by its policy, and it is
reasonable to allow the insurer to treat as a breach the failure by its insured
to give notice of an exchange of vehicles.
What seems to have gone unnoticed is that Statutory Condition #1 is
nicely worded to achieve exactly this result.
1(1) Material Change in Risk-The insured named in this contract shall promptly
notify the insurer, or its local agent, in writing, of any change in the risk material
to the contract and within his knowledge.
(2) Without restricting the generality of the foregoing the words "change in the
risk material to the contract" include:
(a) any change in the insurable interest of the insured named in this
contract in the automobile by sale, assignment or otherwise, except through
change of title by succession, death or proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act
(Canada);
"'Section 10OM(4) of the Nova Scotia Act, S.N.S. 1966, c. 79, refers back to
subsection (2). The reference should be to subsection (3). The Ontario equivalent
is s. 240(4). R.S.O. 1970, c. 224.
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Statutory Default in Auto Insurance
Statutory Condition #1(1) is virtually identical to Statutory Condition
#4 in the Fire Insurance Part of the Act.3 2
It has been held that Statutory Condition #4 only obliges the insured
to give notice of changes which affect the risk adversely. At common law, a
change in the risk after the policy was issued did not have to be reported at
all. There was no opportunity for the insurer to get off the risk. Thus, it
would be harsh to read the statutory condition as avoiding the insured's cover
if he failed to give notice of changes which materially improved the risk.
Nevertheless, Statutory Condition #1 (2) is worded so as to include in
those material changes which must be reported "any change in the insurable
interest ... in the automobile by sale, assignment or otherwise."
Applying this strictly to Avery Young we could say that he breached
the statutory condition by failing to notify the Halifax Ins. Co. of his sale of
the 1969 Pontiac. (This assumes that notification 20 days later, and after
an accident, was not "prompt notification.") The result would be a breach
of condition giving the insurer a defence against Young but not against his
victims.
This would be the same result which MacKeigan C.J. reached; indeed,
it would be quite correct to call Young's conduct a "default" within the
meaning of paragraph 98 (4) (b). However, I emphasize that it would be a
"default of the insured ... in contravention of this Part [of the Insurance
Act]," not a "default... in contravention... of the terms of the contract."
The proposed analysis has two advantages: it uses existing categories of con-
tractual breach instead of adding a new one; it also seems to involve less
violence to the statutory language. Statutory Condition # 1 (2) is quite aptly
worded to achieve the interpretation proposed whereas, I submit, MacKeigan
C.J. has seriously strained the language of paragraph 98(4) (b).
It must be noted that the analysis I have suggested would produce a
breach of the statutory condition whenever the insured parts with the vehicle
described in his policy and without reference to whether he acquires a new
vehicle.
It may at first be thought that this is unnecessarily harsh in view of the
likelihood that the insured has improved his insurer's risk inasmuch as he no
longer has any vicarious liability for losses caused by the described vehicle.
Whether the risk is improved or increased may depend upon whether the
insured now makes increased use of borrowed vehicles, perhaps uninsured
and in worse mechanical condition. This is a matter which could be left to be
proven whenever the issue arises. However, it does not seem unreasonable
to give Statutory Condition #1 (2) a strict reading and to justify it by saying
that, irrespective of materiality, the insurer is entitled to know, not only about
replacement vehicles, but about every transaction purporting to affect the
insured's ownership of the vehicle named in his policy.
32 See: the Schedule to Part VII of the Nova Scotia Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148.
Similarly, in Ontario compare Statutory Condition 4 with s. 122 with Statutory Condition
1 under s. 205.
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The Minister of Transport for Ontario v. Economical Mutual Ins. Co.a8
involved just such an issue. The insured, McNaughton, sold his "described
vehicle," a Fargo pick-up truck, and later bought an Oldsmobile, without any
notice of either transaction to his insurer. Later still, he injured Elsey while
driving an uninsured Pontiac borrowed from Webb. Elsey was compensated
by the Ontario Unsatisfied Judgment Fund and, as in Halifax Ins. Co. v.
Judgment Recovery and as in the General Security3 4 case, the dispute was
between the Fund and the tortfeasor's insurer.
The factor distinguishing the Economical Mutualr case from the other
two was that about a month elapsed between sale of the Fargo truck and
purchase of the Oldsmobile. The insurer argued that McNaughton's policy
lapsed when he sold the Fargo. This argument was based, not on the statute,
but on the contention that insurable interest in the object of the insurance
is a necessary condition for the continued existence of the insurance and that
the entire policy lapses when the insured parts with his interest in the de-
scribed automobile.
Lerner I. distinguished a line of English cases and held that Section A
of an auto policy, the third party liability cover, is an independent insurance,
not requiring any insurable interest in the described vehicle. In effect, by
disposing of his Fargo truck, McNaughton had converted his owner's policy
into a non-owner's policy.
On the point which is of interest to our analysis of Halifax Ins. Co. v.
Judgment Recovery, Lerner J. asserted that McNaughton breached Statutory
Condition #1 by selling the Fargo without notifying his insurer, but this was
exactly the kind of breach which could not be raised against the third party
victim by reason of subsection 223 (3) of the Ontario Act as it then was. 0
Thus, Economical Mutual Ins. Co. was liable to reimburse the Ontario
Minister of Transport, and following the same analysis the Halifax Ins. Co.
would be liable to Rickey Lane and Judgment Recovery (N.S.) Ltd. would
not.
This reaches the same result as the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal but,
it is submitted, by a line of analysis which is to be preferred.
83 (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 651; 1 O.R. (2d) 459; [1974] I.L.R. 761 (H.CJ.).
34 Supra note 20.
35 Supra note 33.
36Now s. 225(4) of the Ontario Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, and s. 98(4) of the
Nova Scotia Act, S.N.S. 1966, c. 79.
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